![]() Ready: The device can be encrypted by using MDM policy, which requires the device meet the following requirements: TPM version (applies to Windows 10/11 only) – The version of the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) chip detected on the Windows device.įor more information on how we query the TPM version, see DeviceStatus CSP - TPM Specification.Įncryption readiness – An evaluation of the devices readiness to support an applicable encryption technology, like BitLocker or FileVault encryption. OS version – The version of Windows or macOS on the device. OS – The device platform, such as Windows or macOS. You can select a device from the list to drill-in and view additional details from the devices Device encryption status pane. The Encryption report pane displays a list of the devices you manage with high-level details about those devices. The encryption report supports reporting on devices that run the following operating system versions: The following sections provide details about the information that Intune presents in the report. The encryption report shows common details across the supported devices you manage. Select Devices > Monitor, and then under Configuration, select Encryption report. To find the report, Sign in to the Microsoft Intune admin center. The recovery key options that are available depend on the type of device you're viewing. The class key is protected by a combination of the user’s password and the hardware UID when FileVault is turned on.The Microsoft Intune encryption report is a centralized location to view details about a device's encryption status and find options to manage device recovery keys. Volume and metadata contents are encrypted with this volume encryption key, which is wrapped with the class key. All APFS volumes are created with a volume encryption key by default. On a Mac with Apple silicon and those with the T2 chip, all FileVault key handling occurs in the Secure Enclave encryption keys are never directly exposed to the Intel CPU. Provide a swift and secure method for wiping content via deletion of necessary cryptographic materialĮnable users to change their password (and in turn the cryptographic keys used to protect their files) without requiring re-encryption of the entire volume Protect the system from a brute-force attack directly against storage media removed from Mac Require the user’s password for decryption This hierarchy of keys is designed to simultaneously achieve four goals: Internal volume encryption on a Mac with Apple silicon as well as those with the T2 chip is implemented by constructing and managing a hierarchy of keys, and builds on the hardware encryption technologies built into the chip. ![]() Starting in macOS 11, the system volume is protected by the signed system volume (SSV) feature, but the data volume remains protected by encryption. In macOS 10.15, this includes both the system volume and the data volume. Without valid login credentials or a cryptographic recovery key, the internal APFS volumes remain encrypted and are protected from unauthorised access even if the physical storage device is removed and connected to another computer. Internal storage with FileVault turned on
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